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We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and informa-
tion about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560
participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff
associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or
lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low,
High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and
Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment.
Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there
is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social
information and payoffs do not interact with each other.
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1. Introduction
Dishonesty is a major concern in modern societies. Cheating in exams, fare-dodging,
doping in sport, curriculum-vitae inflation, questionable research practices, tax evasion,
misrepresentation of output at work, the misuse of public funds and other fraud generate
large societal costs. Dishonesty is at the heart of the principal-agent problem, and can
cause substantial damage by eroding trust, creating uncertainty, reducing efficiency, and being
harmful for collaboration. Given its significant economic consequences, understanding what
lies behind dishonest behavior is central.
Economists have worked on the determinants of unethical behavior for decades. It is
traditionally assumed that dishonesty results from the comparison of the expected associated
pecuniary benefits and costs (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, more-
recent work has shown that there is less dishonesty than that predicted by the standard model
(for overviews see, e.g., Gerlach et al., 2019; Abeler et al., 2019). One common explanation
is that individuals incur intrinsic costs by lying, although whether and how these costs respond
to external factors is still subject to debate.
While the standard economic model of crime predicts that dishonesty should rise with
the payoffs, the empirical evidence is not so clear-cut. A number of recent contributions in the
deception game have shown that senders are more likely to lie to receivers as the incentives
to do so rise (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2008; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Erat and
Gneezy, 2012; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017), but work on incentives in non-strategic games
mostly finds that dishonesty does not vary with payoffs (Mazar et al., 2008; Wiltermuth, 2011;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gino et al., 2013; Hugh-Jones, 2016; Andersen et al.,
2018; Abeler et al., 2019).1 Balasubramanian et al. (2017) find a hump-shaped relationship
between dishonesty and the stakes. In Cohn et al. (2019), a lost wallet is more likely to be
returned if it contains more money. Last, Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) show that dishonesty
1The finding that monetary incentives increase dishonesty in strategic but not in non-strategic games is
confirmed in the meta-analysis of Gerlach et al. (2019). We should bear in mind that strategic games such
as the deception game conflate distributional preferences and lying costs, as lying affects not only the absolute
payoffs but also the relative payoff as compared to other individuals.
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increases with payoffs when concerns about being exposed as a liar are removed.
It might in addition be thought that individuals are more responsive to payoffs when they
can justify their own lie by a larger fraction of others being dishonest. Only little is known
about these social-norm effects. While informing subjects about others’ behavior has been
shown to have at most a weak effect on average dishonesty (Diekmann et al., 2015; Kroher
and Wolbring, 2015; Abeler et al., 2019; Akin, 2019), this effect seems to be stronger when
individual beliefs are taken into account (Rauhut, 2013).
We here contribute to the existing literature by investigating the impact of both social
information and monetary incentives on dishonesty. We ask the following questions. Is
cheating influenced by the size of payoffs in the context of a repeated setting? Does
information about others’ behavior matter, and produce contagion in behavior? Do the
effects of information and payoffs interact with each other? We address these questions in
a laboratory experiment, and develop a theoretical model of the decision to be dishonest.
Our experiment is based on a modified version of the non-strategic cheating game
developed by Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017). Participants observe a number from one to
six where a payoff is associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the
number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff (see also Gneezy et al., 2018;
Abeler et al., 2019). We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and
information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). The variable of interest
is the extensive margin: the fraction of subjects who cheat. We predict the decisions taken by
the participants in our cheating game from a dynamic model of lying choices in which agents
have heterogeneous beliefs about the true fraction of liars.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work on the interaction between
social information and payoffs in shaping dishonesty. Another advantage of our work here is
that we can observe cheating at the individual level, and so do not have to rely on statistical
distributions to infer dishonesty. This is important, as Hilbig and Thielmann (2017) suggest
that lying is heterogeneous, with some agents not responding to payoffs, while others lie more
as payoffs rise and a third group lies less. Last, the participants play 20 rounds of our cheating
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game, allowing us to observe possible contagion or convergence over time.
We show that dishonesty is sharply lower with Very High payoffs (where participants
can earn from 4 to 24 Euros), as compared to High (1 to 6 Euros) and Low (0.10 to 0.60
cents) payoffs, so that subjects are less likely to cheat only for the highest stakes. In line
with our theoretical predictions, information about others has, on average, a relatively small
or no effect on lying. Participants are responsive to social information if the accuracy of
their beliefs is taken into account. Those who overestimate (underestimate) the fraction of
liars are less (more) likely to be dishonest when they receive this information, so that the
two adjustment effects cancel each other out. Last, we find no evidence of any interaction
between social information and payoffs. Dishonesty increases significantly over time in all
payoff conditions, yet with a similar trend with and without information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design, and Section 3 sets out the theoretical predictions. The empirical results then appear in
Section 4. Last, Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental design
2.1. Cheating game
Our game is a modified version of the “observed game” developed by Kajackaite and Gneezy
(2017). It is played for 20 periods. Figure 1 provides an overview of the experimental
procedure. In each period, subjects are privately shown six boxes labeled “a, b, c, d, e and
f” on their screen. The numbers from one to six are randomly assigned to these boxes, but
participants do not know which number is in which box. Participants reveal the numbers
by clicking on the boxes and report anonymously the number associated with the first box
that they opened (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). A higher
reported number is associated with a higher payoff, as described in Section 2.2.2
2After our repeated cheating game, we ran a separate variant using the strategy method. Participants were
asked to report a number for each possible outcome of the box and each possible fraction of others cheating. We
do not show the results from this game, as participants had difficulty in understanding how to fill in the lengthy
table (containing 6×5 = 30 numbers).
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Figure 1: Experimental flow
Participants can either truthfully report the number they observe or lie and report a
higher number in order to increase their payoff. In line with an expanding body of literature
(see the recent review by Abeler et al., 2019) our controlled laboratory experiment has no
penalties, and participants are told that their decisions are anonymous and private (see the
instructions in Appendix A.1). The purpose is to test how and whether dishonesty is influenced
by payoffs and information in the absence of any material costs. While most real-life situations
involve a positive probability of detection and punishment, this simplification is an asset here,
as only intrinsic lying costs will matter for the honesty decision. Note that Potters and Stoop
(2016) and Dai et al. (2017) both show that simple games like that used here predict behavior
in the field. Furthermore, the participants’ answers to the post-experiment questionnaire
confirm that they did not worry about penalties or punishment of any kind.
Unlike in the basic coin-tossing or die-rolling games, we measure dishonesty at the
individual level, and thus do not have to rely on statistical distributions in order to infer it. This
is an advantage, as we expect heterogeneity in behavior (Hilbig and Thielmann, 2017) and
beliefs about what others are doing (Rauhut, 2013). Observing dishonesty at the individual
level allows the classification of individuals into cheating types based on their behavior across
periods (see Section 4.1). We can also create groups based on the observed gap between
beliefs and the true fraction of liars (see Section 4.2). In addition, this approach allows us to
inform individuals about the observed fraction of dishonest subjects in the previous period.
To minimize the feeling of being observed, the instructions make clear that mistakes are not
5
punished and could be unintentional.
Note that a number of contributions have used cheating games in which dishonesty
is observable (e.g., Gibson et al., 2013; Faravelli et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 2018; Kocher
et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2019). Observing dishonesty at the individual level is also possible
in deception games (e.g., Gneezy, 2005) and tax-evasion games (see, e.g., Malezieux, 2018).
Gneezy et al. (2018) and Abeler et al. (2019) compare behavior in a basic cheating game to that
in an observed cheating game. Both find that dishonesty falls with observability, suggesting
that individuals care about their reputations.
2.2. Treatments
We use a 2×3 between-subjects design, as shown in Table 1. The first dimension is the level
of monetary incentives, i.e. the payoff per reported number (see Table 2). In the treatments
with low payoffs (hereafter Low), participants can earn between 10 cents (if they report a
one) and 60 cents (if they report a six). In the high-payoff treatment (High), these payoffs are
multiplied by 10, so that participants can earn between 1 and 6 Euros. Last, in the very-high
payoff treatment (Very High), the low payoffs are multiplied by 40, with earnings of between
4 and 24 Euros.
The second dimension relates to the amount of social information. At the beginning
of the experiment, participants are randomly assigned to a group with five members. The
composition of the groups remains unchanged over the 20 periods. In the treatments without
information, subjects play 20 rounds of the game without any information about the behavior
of the other four group members. With information, participants are informed at the end of
each period about the percentage of the others in the group who correctly reported their first
click. Comparing the With and Without Information treatments allows us to investigate the
effect of social information on dishonesty.
In all six treatments, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about others’ over-reporting after the
subject reports the number that they saw. Following Rauhut (2013), we are thus able to





Low High Very High N
Without Without/Low Without/High Without/Very High
N=70 N=95 N=95 260
With With/Low With/High With/Very High
N=90 N=120 N=90 300
N 160 215 185 560
Table 2: Payoffs (in Euros)
Treatment
Reported number
1 2 3 4 5 6
Low 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
High 1 2 3 4 5 6
Very High 4 8 12 16 20 24
elicitation of beliefs was incentivized. In the With Information treatments, the belief was
measured before the receipt of information about others’ behavior.
2.3. Procedure
The laboratory experiment took place at the LABoratory of EXperiments in Economics
and Management LABEX-EM (CREM-University of Rennes 1, France) in September 2017,
March to May 2018, and September 2018. Ztree was used to program the experiment, and
participant recruitment was organized via Orsee. Before the experiment started, participants
had to sign a consent form. They were then randomly allocated to the desks. Instructions were
given on paper and read aloud before the game started.
At the end of the experiment, risk aversion was elicited using the task devised by
Holt and Laury (2002). Furthermore, to control for possible cognitive biases, participants
were asked to play a memory game designed to measure difficulties in memorizing numbers.
Last, participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire on their socio-demographic
characteristics, attitudes, and perception of the experiment (see Appendix A.2 for the data
description). This post-experimental questionnaire allows us to test whether participants
understood the experiment and in particular that mistakes would not be punished. The average
payment was 19.94 Euros. Appendix A.2 contains the summary statistics, showing that the
7
sample was balanced across treatments.
3. Theoretical predictions
To illustrate the decision that agents face in our cheating game and derive testable hypotheses,
we here set out a theoretical model of the decision to be dishonest. In our theory, as in the
experiment, we focus on a setting in which dishonesty is not punished.
In each period of our cheating game, individuals observe a random number. They can
either truthfully report the number seen and be paid m or report a higher number and be paid
n (where n depends on the size of the lie). The payment scheme in the Low, High, and Very
High treatments is designed such that m and n are multiplied by the same factor x as payoffs
rise. The pecuniary advantage from lying is U(xn)−U(xm), where U denotes the utility of
wealth.
Following the existing literature, we assume that individuals face intrinsic costs of lying.
These include (1) a fixed Kantian cost k (as in Figuières et al., 2013; Kajackaite and Gneezy,
2017; Abeler et al., 2019), (2) a variable cost V that rises with xn, i.e., agents worry more
about their reputation as the payoff obtained by dishonesty rises (Kajackaite and Gneezy,
2017), and (3) norm-based costs that vary with the fraction β̂t of other agents who are thought
to be dishonest in period t (Figuières et al., 2013; Le Maux et al., 2019; Abeler et al., 2019).
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of deviating from the social norm is
one, so that beliefs are directly translated into lying costs. Beliefs β̂t depend on two factors:
any information received about the true fraction βt−1 of liars in period t−1, and the individual
type of either optimistic or pessimistic beliefs. Pessimistic individuals have a higher reference
point rH and expect a greater fraction of agents to be dishonest, as compared to optimists who
have a lower reference point of rL:
β̂
j
t = αβt−1 +(1−α)r j, j = L,H. (1)
The parameter α allows us to distinguish between the With and Without Information
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treatments. Without information, α is constrained to be zero, so that beliefs are the reference
points; with information, any value of α ∈ (0,1] may hold and reflects the degree to which
agents react to the information about the true fraction of liars. Even when information is
provided, agents may not adjust their beliefs perfectly (i.e., α < 1, so that the agent type
continues to play a role, with a higher α implying that agents are more responsive to the
information). Note that we have β̂ jt = βt−1 +(1−α)(r j−βt−1). If r j is above (below) βt−1,
then type j overestimates (underestimates) the true fraction.
For each agent type, j = L or H, the fixed cost of cheating ki is uniformly distributed
over the unit interval. Agent i of type j = L or H with parameter ki will cheat in period t if:
U(xn)−U(xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pecuniary advantages
> ki +V (xn)− β̂ jt (βt−1,r j,α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lying costs
, j = L,H. (2)
Let k jt denote the cheating cost at which agents are indifferent between lying and honesty:
k jt =U(xn)−U(xm)−V (xn)+ β̂
j
t . (3)
Any j-type agent with Kantian morality under k jt will lie about his/her true state. Integrating
over all agents yields the fraction of agents who are dishonest in period t:
βt = pkLt +(1− p)kHt
= U(xn)−U(xm)−V (xn)+αβt−1 +(1−α)r̄, (4)
where p and (1− p) are the population shares of low and high types, and r̄ = prL+(1− p)rH
is the average expectation of others’ behavior when no information is received. From Equation
(4), we obtain the partial derivative of βt with respect to the payoff level x:
∂βt
∂x
= nU ′(xn)−mU ′(xm)−nV ′(xn). (5)
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Proposition 1 illustrates the possible cases under the assumption of risk neutrality.3 While
dishonesty is more profitable as payoffs rise (through the first term on the right-hand side of
Equation 5), the utility of the honest payoff (the second term) and lying costs (the third term)
also increase. With a low constant marginal cost of lying (V ′′ = 0 and V ′ < n−mn U
′), lying
becomes more prevalent as x rises (Proposition 1a). With a high constant marginal cost of
lying (V ′′ = 0 and V ′ > n−mn U
′), lying will instead fall (Proposition 1b). If the marginal cost
of lying is not constant (V ′′ 6= 0), we obtain either a maximum (V”>0) or a minimum (V”<0).
As such, two different values of x can yield the same fraction of liars (Proposition 1c).
Proposition 1. The effect of payoffs under risk neutrality:
(a) if V ′′ = 0 and V ′ < (n−m)n U
′, then ∂βt
∂x > 0,
(b) if V ′′ = 0 and V ′ > (n−m)n U
′, then ∂βt
∂x < 0,
(c) if V ′′ ≷ 0, then ∂
2βt
∂x2 ≶ 0.
Proof. Assuming constant marginal utility U ′, Equation (5) becomes (n−m)U ′− nV ′ > 0.
The second derivative determines whether we have a maximum (V ′′ > 0), a minimum (V ′′ <
0), or a constant marginal cost of lying (V ′′ = 0).
To analyze the effect of social information, we appeal to the concept of a stationary
point. Equation (4) shows that the fraction of liars rises with past dishonesty under the





On the contrary, without information (α = 0) we have:
βWithout =U(xn)−U(xm)−V (xn)+ r̄. (7)
The effect of social information, defined as the gap between βWith and βWithout, hence depends
3In the empirical results there is no significant association between dishonesty and risk-aversion. Risk-
neutrality does not thus seem to be a restrictive hypothesis. See Gneezy et al. (2018) for a similar assumption.
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on two factors: (1) whether information is exogenously provided (whether α is different from
zero) and (2) whether agents actually process the information about the true fraction under
the With Information treatment (the value of α in Equation (6)). Moreover, as shown in
Proposition 2 below, there is a third factor: (3) the position of the average reference point
r̄ relative to the true fraction βWithout. It is only when agents erroneously estimate the true
fraction on average that the social information has an effect.
Proposition 2. The average effect of information: if r̄ S βWithout, then βWith T βWithout.
Proof. We have βWith > βWithout iff [βWithout − r̄ + (1− α)r̄]/(1− α) > βWithout, which is
equivalent to r̄ < βWithout.
Replacing βt−1 with βWith and βWithout in Equation (3) yields the equilibrium share of
liars among j-types, with and without information:
β
j
With = βWith +(1−α)(r
j− r̄) and β jWithout = βWithout +(r
j− r̄), j = L,H. (8)
Since rL < r̄ < rH , we expect differences in the fraction of liars by type. However, these
differences will be smaller when there is information, as stated in Proposition 3. H-types, who
expect a large fraction of others to lie, are on average more dishonest and push the equilibrium
upwards; L-types, who are optimistic about others’ honesty, pull the equilibrium downwards.
These effects counteract each other and yield convergence in behavior.




Proof. We have |β jWith−βWith| = (1−α)|r
j− r̄| and |β jWithout−βWithout| = |r
j− r̄|. As α ∈
(0,1] in the With Information treatment, the first term is necessarily smaller than the second.
Last, payoffs and social information are shown to interact with each other. Let ∆ stand
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for the average treatment effect of social information:













As α/(1−α) is positive, any change in payoffs that affects βWithout is exacerbated if
agents are informed about the true extent of norm violations. There are multiplier effects. As
demonstrated in Proposition 4, the magnitude of the interaction, however, depends on how
elastic beliefs are to the true fraction. If α is under 0.5, we expect little interaction between
payoffs and information. We will see convergence in types, as stated in Proposition 3, and the
equilibrium βWith towards which the outcome converges is stable. If instead α is above 0.5,
any deviation from the norm by a small number of individuals will be greatly amplified.
Proposition 4. The interaction of information and payoffs: We have ∂∆
∂x T
∂βWithout
∂x if α T
0.5.
Proof. From Equation (10), α/(1−α) is above one iff α > 0.5.
4. Empirical results
The extensive margin of dishonesty (the fraction of liars) comes from the comparison of the
number observed (the first box clicked on) to the number reported. We create a dummy for
the subject reporting a number above that which he or she first clicked on.4 We find that
– even though we are able to observe dishonesty – a substantial fraction of individuals take
the opportunity to cheat. Over the whole sample, 29% report a number above that they first
clicked on. This figure is remarkably similar to that in Gneezy et al. (2018) in their observed
4The 67 observations in which subjects report a number below that on which they first clicked are not counted
as dishonesty (downward lying).
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Figure 2: The percentage of dishonest subjects over time by payoff condition
(a) Without Information (b) With Information
Note: Without Information covers 5,200 observations, and With Information 6,000 observations.
game. Those who lie predominantly do so to the maximum extent, with 85% reporting a six.
This result is in line with Gneezy et al. (2013) and Andersen et al. (2018). The analysis of
the extent of the lie, i.e. the gap between the observed and reported numbers (the intensive
margin of dishonesty), appears in Appendix A.3.
4.1. The effects of payoffs
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 show the percentage of liars over time across all payoff
conditions, with and without social information. In both panels, dishonesty is lower for very-
high payoffs. Without information, the average percentage of liars over the 20 periods is
32.5% in the Low condition and 31.6% in the High condition (∆ High-Low=0.9 ppts, p-
value from a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test=0.597). This figure is much lower (20%) in the
Very High treatment (∆ Very High-Low=12.5 ppts, p-value=0.000). A similar pattern occurs
with information, as shown in panel (b). The average percentage of liars is 33.6% in Low,
35.1% in High (∆ High-Low=1.5 ppts, p-value=0.325), and 22.9% in Very High (∆ Very
High-Low=10.7 ppts, p-value=0.000).
There is a similar rising trend in dishonesty in all treatments. The fraction of cheaters
increases sharply between periods one and two, which may be considered as a pure learning
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Figure 3: The percentage of liars by payoff and first number seen
Note: Low covers 3,200 observations, High 4,300 observations,
and Very High 3,700 observations. Box 6 does not appear as
dishonesty is not possible when uncovering a six.
effect. However, the percentage of cheaters also continues to rise in subsequent periods.5
Result 1. (a) The percentage of liars is significantly lower in the Very High compared to the
Low and High treatments. (b) In all treatments, the percentage of liars rises over time.
The lower dishonesty observed in the Very High treatment suggests that the greater
honest payoff and/or the lying costs outweigh the larger dishonesty payoff (Proposition 1).
To investigate which explanation fits best, we examine whether a higher first number seen,
i.e., a higher honest payoff, has a differential effect across payoff treatments. Figure 3
shows the dishonesty levels in each of the true states by payoff; for ease of reading we
pool the information and no-information treatments. Our results confirm previous findings
that dishonesty falls with a higher true state (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2013; Gibson et al., 2013;
Andersen et al., 2018). The relationship in Figure 3 is stable over the payoff treatments. The
dishonesty gap between boxes 1 and 5 are 29.5 ppts in Low, 35 ppts in High, and 28.4 ppts
in Very High. This stability suggests that participants care more about the box numbers (from
5Without information, the fraction of liars is significantly larger in the last five than in the first five periods
in all three payoff conditions (Low ∆=8 ppts, p-value=0.027; High ∆=11 ppts, p-value=0.000; Very High ∆=8
ppts, p-value=0.000). The difference between Low and Very High is stable across periods (Period 1-5: ∆=11.9
ppts, p-value=0.000, Period 16-20: ∆=10.9 ppts, p-value=0.000). We see a similar trend in the treatments with
information. Dishonesty rises from period 1-5 to period 16-20 in Low and High (∆=15 ppts, p-value=0.000) but
this increase is not significant in Very High (∆=4 ppts, p-value=0.148).
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Table 3: Cheating types by payoff and information
N Never cheater Partial cheater Always cheater
Panel A. By payoffs
Low 160 35.6% 51.9% 12.5%
High 215 30.7% 57.7% 11.6%
Very high 185 48.1% 46.5% 5.4%
Panel B. By information
Without 260 45.8% 44.2% 10%
With 300 31% 59.3% 9.7%
Notes: Based on behavior across the 20 rounds. A never cheater did not cheat in
any of the periods in which the first number 6= 6, an always cheater cheated in all
periods in which the first number 6= 6, and a partial cheater cheated in some but
not all of the periods in which the first number 6= 6.
1 to 5), i.e., how far they are from box 6, and less about the Euro values associated with
each box. In other words, the greater honest payoff in Very High may not explain the lower
dishonesty in that treatment. The explanation would lie instead in a rise in intrinsic lying
costs.
We also consider the extent to which the Very High result comes from a change in
cheating types. The existing literature has categorized individuals according to their frequency
of lying (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2013; Gibson et al., 2013; Hilbig and Thielmann, 2017). We take
this approach and classify individuals as (1) “Always cheaters” (those who were dishonest in
all periods by overreporting a figure), (2) “Partial cheaters” (those who were dishonest in at
least one period), and (3) “Never cheaters” (those who were never dishonest). Table 3 shows
the distribution of these three types in each treatment. The percentage of “Always cheaters”
is relatively low, at around 10-12%, in all treatments.
We can see from panel (A) of Table 3 that the fraction of “Never cheaters” is
significantly higher in Very High (∆ Very High-Low=12.5 ppts, p-value=0.019), and that of
“Partial cheaters” (∆ Very High-Low=7.1 ppts, p-value=0.019) and “Always cheaters” (∆ Very
High-Low=5.4 ppts, p-value=0.319) is lower. A closer look at “Partial cheaters” also shows
that this type cheats less in Very High, with a percentage of 43.7% in Low, 41.5% in High,
and 35.1% in Very High. The difference between Low/High and Very High is significant.
The lower dishonesty in Very High thus partly comes from a shift from “Partial” or “Always
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cheaters” to “Never cheaters”, and partly from “Partial cheaters” reducing their dishonesty.
Result 2. (a) In all treatments, the percentage of dishonest subjects falls with the true number.
(b) The fraction of “Never cheaters” is higher in Very High compared to High and Low.
4.2. The effects of social information
Figure 4 shows the fraction of cheaters over time by information conditions. It can be seen
that social information has either no effect on dishonesty (Low treatment) or a small positive
effect (High and Very High treatments). In Low, the average percentage of liars over the 20
periods is 32% without information and 34% with information (p-value on ∆ with/without
information=0.487). The analogous figures in the High and Very High treatments are 32% vs.
35% (p-value=0.016), and 20% vs. 23% (p-value=0.029).
Panel (B) of Table 3 shows that the percentage of Always cheaters is stable across
the two treatments, while the percentage of “Never cheaters” falls by 15 percentage points,
and that of “Partial cheaters” rises by the same amount (p-values=0.000). Information thus
significantly increases the fraction of conditional cheaters. Our findings are summarized in
Result 3.
Result 3. (a) Information has either no or a small positive effect on dishonesty. (b) The
percentage of “Partial cheaters” rises significantly with information.
While we find a significant effect of information under High and Very High payoffs,
the effect is only small in size on average. Our theory provides a number of explanations.
It may first be that individuals without information form heterogeneous beliefs, but still
correctly estimate the true fraction of liars on average (Proposition 2). Some might believe
that individuals are more dishonest than they actually are (overestimators) while others think
they are actually less dishonest (underestimators). If this were the case, on average, the belief
could still be correct. Second, if under- and overestimators adjust their behavior to information
in opposite ways, there may be no effect on average (Proposition 3). As we will see below, it
is the second explanation that applies.
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Figure 4: The percentage of dishonest individuals over time by information
(a) Low (b) High
(c) Very High
Note: The Low, High and Very High treatments cover 3,200, 4,300 and 3,700 observations respectively.
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Figure 5: Beliefs and the true percentage of others who are honest
(a) Without Information (b) With Information
Notes: The Without Information treatment covers 5,200 observations and the With Information treatment
6,000 observations. Negative (positive) values imply that the true percentage honest is larger (smaller) than
the percentage believed honest, i.e., the individual overestimates (underestimates) dishonesty.
Figure 5 plots the difference between beliefs about the percentage of others who are
honest and the actual percentage. Panel (a) shows that beliefs deviate widely from the true
percentage without information. On average, individuals significantly overestimate the true
percentage of liars (average belief=68.1%; true fraction=72.1%; ∆=4.0 ppts, p-value=0.000).
In other words, individuals misjudge the dishonesty of others at both the individual and
average levels. In panel (b) of Figure 5, these differences narrow substantially when
information is provided. However, significant average differences are still found (average
belief=69.1%; true fraction=68.1%; ∆=-1.0 ppt, p-value=0.003).
Following our theory, we create two groups based on the observed gap between beliefs
and truth. Underestimators think that the percentage of dishonest subjects is lower than it
actually is, and overestimators believe that it is higher. Over- and underestimators represent
39% and 35% of the sample without information, and 25% and 30% with information. In
the With Information treatment, the true percentage was provided at the end of each period
(see Figure 1). We thus analyze the effect of information on the behavior of over- and
underestimators in the subsequent period.
Figure 6 shows the level of dishonesty by information and over/underestimation. Across
the 20 periods, overestimators are more dishonest than underestimators without information,
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Figure 6: The percentage of liars by information and over-/underestimation
Note: The Without Information treatment includes 1,910
overestimators and 1,714 underestimators, and the With
Information treatment includes 1,450 overestimators and 1,679
underestimators.
with figures of 48% and 13%, respectively (∆=35 ppts, p-value=0.000). This gap narrows
substantially with information, as the figure drops to 40% for overestimators and rises to
28% for underestimators (∆=12 ppts, p-value=0.000). The evolution of this gap over time
is also of interest. In the first five periods, the difference is 23% without information (p-
value=0.000) and 22% with information (p-value=0.000); the corresponding figures in the last
five periods are 39% (p-value=0.000) and 6% (p-value=0.090). Without information, we thus
see divergence in the dishonesty of over- and underestimators, while on the contrary there is
convergence with information. Looking at the size of the changes, underestimators react more
strongly to information than do overestimators (overestimators: ∆=-8 ppts, p-value=0.000,
and underestimators: ∆=16 ppts, p-value=0.000). This explains why we find on average a
weakly positive effect of information on dishonesty.
Result 4. (a) Individuals estimate dishonesty more correctly when information is provided. (b)
Those who overestimated (underestimated) dishonesty in the previous period are more (less)
likely to be dishonest themselves. (c) Underestimators react more strongly to information than
do overestimators.
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Figure 7: The percentage of liars by payoff and information, conditional on over-
/underestimation
(a) Overestimators (b) Underestimators
Note: From left to right, the numbers of observations are as follows. Overestimators: 536, 403, 706, 636,
668, 411. Underestimators: 461, 490, 708, 752, 545, 437.
4.3. The interaction between payoffs and social information
We now ask whether payoffs and information interact with each other (Proposition 4). Figure
4 shows that the effect of payoffs is similar across the two information treatments. We evaluate
the statistical significance of the interaction from the empirical bootstrap distribution of the
difference (1,000 replications, sampling with replacement). The difference in dishonesty
levels with and without social information does not vary across payoff conditions (e.g., ∆
Low/Very high=1.8 ppts, p-value=0.398).
Our theory and the empirical results in Section 4.2 show, however, that it is important
to consider heterogeneity in beliefs at the individual level. We further investigate potential
interactions by considering whether information and payoffs interact with respect to the
convergence of the dishonesty of over- and underestimators. Figure 7 (a) plots the dishonesty
of overestimators by information and payoffs. The difference between the With and Without
Information treatments is 5% in Low, 12% in High, and 6% in Very High. There is a similar
pattern in panel (b) for underestimators, but in the opposite direction. The difference is -11%
in Low, -21% in High, and -10% in Very High. In other words, the gap between the dishonesty
of over- and underestimators is lower with information, regardless of the payoffs.
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Result 5. On average, payoffs and information about others’ behavior do not interact.
4.4. Regression analysis
We provide further statistical evidence via a regression analysis. As each subject is observed
20 times, we can use panel methods, and estimate random-effect probit models in which the
dependent variable is the binary decision to lie. Standard errors are clustered at the group
level to control for interdependence within groups.
The results appear in Table 4. In column (1), we control only for the treatments and the
period. The estimated coefficients confirm that the percentage of liars is significantly lower
with Very High payoffs and that social information has a positive but small significant effect.
The estimated period coefficients indicate that the percentage of liars constantly rises over
time.
Column (2) adds controls for socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes towards
dishonesty (see Appendix A.2 for the data description). While the effect of Very High is
slightly larger, the effect of social information becomes insignificant. In line with previous
work (e.g., Abeler et al., 2019), we find that women cheat less. The religious and those
who consider cheating less justifiable are also less likely to cheat. Risk aversion, measured
by a Holt and Laury task, is not significant, while a greater number of correct answers in
our memory game is negatively related to dishonesty. This game was introduced to help
separate lying from mistakes resulting from memory. The positive coefficient suggests that
over-reporting cannot be attributed to mistakes reflecting memory issues.
In column (3), we add controls for the first number seen. The negative effect of Very
High rises further. In line with earlier results, we find that a higher first number produces less
dishonesty.
The regression in column (4) controls for both the belief about how many others cheated
(Believes X/4 dishonest) and the actual fraction dishonest in the previous period (Actual X/4
dishonest). The significantly-negative effect of Very High is unchanged, as is the insignificant
effect of information. A higher expected fraction of dishonest others is strongly positively
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Table 4: The marginal effects from dishonesty regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Info 0.062* 0.049 0.066 0.064
(0.033) (0.032) (0.050) (0.048)
Payoff: High 0.020 0.003 -0.009 -0.012
(0.048) (0.048) (0.084) (0.078)
Payoff: Very high -0.105** -0.131*** -0.180** -0.178**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.077) (0.070)
Period 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female (binary) -0.060** -0.077 -0.074
(0.030) (0.049) (0.050)
Economics (binary) -0.007 -0.002 0.007
(0.031) (0.048) (0.049)
Risk aversion (1=Low to 10=High) 0.009 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Morality (1=High to 10=Low) 0.039*** 0.052** 0.054***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.020)
Religious (1=No to 10=High) -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Political orientation (1=Left to 10=Right) -0.012* -0.014 -0.015
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
Financial knowledge (1=None to 3=High) 0.025 0.029 0.031
(0.029) (0.045) (0.047)
Memory Game (2=Low to 9=High) 0.024** 0.036** 0.034**
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017)
First box: 2 -0.021 -0.029
(0.017) (0.018)
First box: 3 -0.144*** -0.154***
(0.027) (0.026)
First box: 4 -0.273*** -0.305***
(0.046) (0.043)
First box: 5 -0.360*** -0.404***
(0.070) (0.065)
First box: 6 -0.376*** -0.419***
(0.077) (0.070)
Believes 1/4 dishonest 0.053***
(0.014)
Believes 1/2 dishonest 0.079***
(0.021)
Believes 3/4 dishonest 0.088***
(0.025)
Believes all dishonest 0.135***
(0.042)
Actual 1/4 dishonest 0.015
(0.012)
Actual 1/2 dishonest 0.017
(0.013)
Actual 3/4 dishonest 0.031*
(0.017)
Actual all dishonest 0.042
(0.030)
N 11200 11200 11200 10640
Notes: These are marginal effects from random-effect probit models, calculated as the probability
of a positive outcome, assuming that the random effect for that observation’s panel is zero.
Standard errors clustered at the group level appear in parentheses. Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.1,
**p≤ 0.05,***p≤ 0.01.
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correlated to the probability of lying. By way of contrast, the actual previous-period behavior
of others has no effect on average. However, it should be remembered that subjects were only
aware of others’ behavior in the With Information treatments.
To see whether the effect of others’ behavior differs by information conditions, we
estimate the column-(4) regression including interactions of beliefs and actual behavior
with an information-treatment dummy. As the marginal effects of interactions cannot be
determined from the estimated coefficients in random-effect probit models, we list the
marginal effects of beliefs/actual behavior conditional on the information provided (see panel
(A) of Table 5). These reveal that, with information, more observed liars in the group produces
a higher likelihood of own cheating. As expected, the effect of others’ behavior is insignificant
in the treatment without information. The marginal effects of the belief variable show that
information reduces the importance of beliefs.
We last consider whether payoffs and social information interact, via interaction terms
in the column-(3) regression. The resulting marginal effects are listed in Table 5, panel (B).
In line with our previous findings, dishonesty is lower in the Very High treatments, both with
and without social information. However, these effects are similar across the With Information
treatments, suggesting no significant interactions.
5. Conclusion
The question of how monetary incentives affect lying, and whether lying depends on others’
behavior, has long puzzled economists. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing
these effects in the particular context of a non-strategic cheating game. Our variable of
interest is the percentage of liars in our sample, although similar but smaller effects were
found regarding the size of the lie (see Appendix A.3).
In our model, the intrinsic lying costs include a norm-based component that varies
with others’ dishonesty. Two types of agents are considered: those who overestimate
the true percentage of liars and those who underestimate it. Individual behaviors are
heterogeneous and endogenous to others’ behavior. Our variables also have different time
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Table 5: The marginal effects from dishonesty regressions including interaction terms
Variable Conditional on ME SE
Panel A. Marginal effects from column (4) incl. believes*info, actual*info
Actual 0/4 dishonest Without Information Ref. Ref.
With Info Ref. Ref.
Actual 1/4 dishonest Without Info -0.004 0.011
With Info 0.023* 0.013
Actual 1/2 dishonest Without Info 0.003 0.011
With Info 0.021 0.013
Actual 3/4 dishonest Without Info 0.007 0.025
With Info 0.034** 0.015
Actual all dishonest Without Info -0.016 0.023
With Info 0.059** 0.029
Believes 0/4 dishonest Without Info Ref. Ref.
With Info Ref. Ref.
Believes 1/4 dishonest Without Info 0.077*** 0.02
With Info 0.025** 0.012
Believes 1/2 dishonest Without Info 0.093*** 0.025
With Info 0.045*** 0.017
Believes 3/4 dishonest Without Info 0.12*** 0.03
With Info 0.032 0.022
Believes all dishonest Without Info 0.143*** 0.039
With Info 0.077 0.051
Panel B. Marginal effects from column (3) incl. payoff*info
Payoff Low Without Info Ref. Ref.
With Info Ref. Ref.
Payoff High Without Info -0.057 0.098
With Info 0.035 0.07
Payoff Very High Without Info -0.157* 0.091
With Info -0.139** 0.065
Notes: These are marginal effects from random-effect probit models, calculated as the probability
of a positive outcome, assuming that the random effect for that observation’s panel is zero.
Standard errors clustered at the group level appear in parentheses. Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.1,
**p≤ 0.05,***p≤ 0.01.
24
profiles. While the two types both converge in their beliefs and behaviors according to the
true fraction (Proposition 3), the convergence cancels out on average, yielding little change
in the equilibrium (Propositions 2 and 4). From an empirical point of view, these results
underline the importance of analyzing dishonesty at both the average and type levels. Last, as
far as we are aware, we are also the first to consider whether social information and payoffs
interact.
In our experiment, we first find that individuals are less likely to lie when payoffs are
Very High (40 times higher than in the Low payoff treatment). This partly reflects a shift
from “Partial” and “Always” to “Never cheaters”, and partly “Partial cheaters” becoming less
dishonest. Possible explanations are that the cost of lying rises with payoffs (e.g., Cohn et al.,
2019), or that reputational concerns are more pronounced in an observed than an unobserved
cheating game (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). Another explanation is that large payoffs
could increase concerns about the cost that is imposed on the experimenter (Gneezy, 2005;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Gratitude has also been shown to enhance honest
behavior (DeSteno et al., 2019). Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle these explanations.
Second, in line with both our theory and previous work (Diekmann et al., 2015; Kroher
and Wolbring, 2015; Rauhut, 2013), information on others’ dishonesty has, at best, a small
average effect. As empirically suggested in Rauhut (2013), heterogeneity in beliefs matters
here. In our experiment, overestimators become less dishonest with information, while
underestimators become more dishonest. These opposite reactions explain why, on average,
information about others’ dishonesty has only a subdued effect.
Third, according to our theory, any impact of payoffs should be exacerbated when agents
are informed about the true extent of norm violations. Surprisingly, we find no evidence
of any interaction between payoffs and information. While dishonesty is lower in the Very
High treatment, there is no evidence of more honesty when information is provided. Our
model offers an explanation: while information affects behavior at the type level, the aggregate
percentage of liars is little affected, with not much change in dishonesty over time.
We find rising dishonesty over time in all payoff conditions. This cannot be explained
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by contagion in behavior, as it also appears in the Without Information treatment. This trend
could show learning, but our game is straightforward and was understood by the participants,
as shown by their answers to our post-experimental questionnaire (“How did you perceive the
game?”). An alternative is that their perception of being observed (the subjective probability
of being detected as a cheater) evolved over time. However, precautions were taken in the
instructions to make clear that under- or overreporting could be unintentional and was neither
observed nor punished. Participants’ lying costs may also fall over time, as they get used to
being dishonest (e.g., Garrett et al., 2016). Last, prior honesty may provide a “license” to
carry out morally-questionable behavior later on (Blanken et al., 2015). The investigation of
the reasons behind this finding is left for future research.
Another result that deserves attention is the impact of the true state, i.e. how much
honesty is rewarded. In accordance with previous work (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2013; Andersen
et al., 2018), lying is less frequent with higher values of the true number. However, a similar
pattern is found for all payoff treatments, suggesting that what matters for lying is how far
participants are from their best situation (the distance to box 6 in our game) rather than
the Euro values associated with each possible true state. In line with this intuition, most
participants who lied did so to the maximum possible extent when being dishonest (see
Appendix A.3).
To conclude, while our results are consistent with a number of findings in the existing
literature, and reveal no interactions between payoffs and information, they also raise
questions about the underlying mechanisms. How do observability and reputational concerns
affect lying costs in our game? Why is there a rising trend in dishonesty in all treatments?
Would we find contagion in lying in other circumstances? The understanding of these and
other issues offers a formidable agenda for future research.
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A.1. Experimental instructions (translated from French)
General information: Welcome. This experiment will last about an hour and a quarter. We
ask you to not communicate with the other participants for the duration of this experiment.
We also ask you not to write on the Instructions. For your participation, you will receive a
payoff of 2.50 Euros, whatever the decisions you make during the experiment. You can in
addition increase your earnings. The experiment is divided into a number of sections, for
which you will receive separate instructions. Your earnings will be calculated at the end of
the experiment. You will receive by check all of your earnings during the different sections,
in addition to the 2.50 Euros.
Treatment-specific information (varying payoffs and the existence of information):
Please read these instructions carefully. You can earn a certain amount of money depending
on your decisions. You will be randomly assigned to a group of five participants for a series of
twenty periods. The group will remain unchanged over these twenty periods. In each period,
you will see on the screen six boxes marked a, b, c, d, e, and f with numbers hidden behind
them (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). These numbers are placed in a random order that will change each
time. In each period, you will have to click on a box. Once you have clicked on it, you will
see a number appear in bold. For example, in the screen below, you clicked on box "c" and
the hidden number is 4.
You can click on the other boxes but only the first box on which you clicked matters. You will
be asked to report the number you saw at the first click, as described in the screen below:
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The number reported has to be between 1 and 6. Your earnings will be determined by the
number you entered according to the following table (Example: High):
Reported number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff 1 Euro 2 Euros 3 Euros 4 Euros 5 Euros 6 Euros
For example, if you wrote "1", you will receive 1 Euro. If you wrote "2", you will receive 2
Euros; if you wrote "3", you will receive 3 Euros, and so on. The higher the reported number,
the higher your payoff.
In each period, six new boxes will appear on the screen. You will have to click on one of them
and, again, fill in the input boxes. This part of the experiment will end after twenty periods.
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At the end of the experiment one period will be drawn randomly to determine your payoff,
and you will be paid according to the number you entered in this period.
In each period, we will also ask you to guess the percentage of those in your group who have
correctly reported their first click (excluding yourself). For example, in the screen below, you
are asked to choose between 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%.
[Next a screen will appear and inform you about the correct answer] (text in brackets only in
the information treatment). One of the percentages you have entered will be randomly selected
at the end of the experiment, and you will receive 50 Euro cents if you guessed correctly.
Important: your decisions are anonymous and private. The computer program does not allow
us to link your identity to your answers. Errors will not be punished and the experiment will
continue even in the case of mistakes. You will be paid according to what you report. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to see you!
Memory game: You will now participate in a memory game. Be careful: numbers will
appear on the screen. You will have to memorize them and report the whole sequence. The
list of numbers to remember will become longer and longer. It is forbidden to write them
down or use a calculator. The participant in this session with the highest score in this memory




Table A.1: Description and statistics of the control variables
Treatment
Variable Description Total 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age Age of subject 21.50 22.67 22.57 22.96 20.18 19.97 21.34
Female Is female (Y/N) 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.38
Economics Is an Economics student (Y/N) 0.43 0.16 0.30 0.52 0.71 0.34 0.41
Risk aversion Number of safe choices in Holt/Laury
2002 risk-aversion game: higher=more risk-
averse
6.22 5.96 6.12 6.14 6.18 6.42 6.42
Cheating attitude Average assessment of justifiability of 11
practices on a 1-10 scale (taken from the
World Values Survey): higher=less moral
3.23 3.07 3.31 3.38 3.32 3.15 3.07
Religious Importance of God in life: 1=No importance,
10=High importance
3.52 3.74 3.66 3.41 3.60 3.37 3.38
Political orientation 1 leaning to Left, 10 leaning to Right 4.61 4.59 4.26 4.36 5.08 4.75 4.48
Finance Financial knowledge: 1=None, 2=Some,
3=High
2.33 2.29 2.36 2.20 2.45 2.29 2.34
Memory game Points achieved in memory game:
higher=better memory
6.23 5.99 6.20 6.11 6.36 6.28 6.38
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A.3. Intensive margin: the determinants of the intensity of the lie
To analyze the size of the lie of those who are dishonest (the intensive margin of dishonesty),
we create a binary variable for the subject lying to the maximum-possible extent.
As shown in Table A.2, a large majority cheat to the maximum possible extent by
reporting a six when the true state was less than six. We find that the percentage of maximum
cheaters falls with the payoff. Without information, the difference to Low is significant for
High (p-value=0.001) and Very High (p-value=0.000); with information, the difference to
Low is significant only for the Very High treatment (p=0.000). The percentage of maximum
cheaters rises slightly but insignificantly over time.
Table A.2: Cheating to the maximum extent by payoff and information
Without Information With Information
N All Period 1-5 Period 16-20 N All Period 1-5 Period 16-20
Total 1436 0.866 0.852 0.873 1862 0.852 0.822 0.882
Low 455 0.934 0.914 0.95 606 0.87 0.858 0.883
High 601 0.874 0.841 0.906 843 0.871 0.841 0.914
Very High 380 0.774 0.788 0.741 413 0.787 0.744 0.806
We next look at the effect of over- and under-estimation on the probability of lying to
the maximum extent. As shown in Figure A.1 (b), in the High and, in particular, Very High
treatments, underestimators are more likely to lie to the maximum extent when information
is provided, which is in line with the result from the extensive margin. However, in the Low
treatment this same percentage falls. One possible explanation is that most underestimators
already cheated to the maximum extent without information, precluding any further increase.
Panel (a) shows that overestimators are slightly less likely to lie to the maximum extent under
the With Information treatment, but that this difference is not significant for any of the payoff
treatments.
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Figure A.1: Maximum lie over-/underestimators by payoff and information
(a) Overestimators (b) Underestimators
Note: Overestimators include 3,360 observations and underestimators 3,393 observations.
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